



COMMENT ON ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS 
UNDER THE ETHIOPIAN FEDERAL STRUCTURE  
Beza Dessalegn ♣ 
Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and multi-cultural country with 
diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. In this sense, the country can 
appropriately be described as a mosaic of different cultures and ethno-linguistic 
groups, although this was not legally and politically recognized until recently. 
The 1995 Ethiopian Constitution expressly recognizes th  ethnic diversity of 
the population. This was initiated in 1991 under the Transitional Charter of 
Ethiopia,1 and it was a departure from the unitary state paradigm in nation-state 
building policies of former regimes. The Ethiopian government now accepts the 
notion of ethnic diversity and aspires to build thenation by using ethnicity as a 
starting point. This approach was further institutionalized in the current Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution. 2 
The various units of the Federation, i.e. the regional states are carved out 
along ethno-linguistic lines. As a result, some writers regard Ethiopia’s 
federation as an ‘ethnic Federation’.3 One of the consequences of the definition 
of the federation on the basis of ethnicity is the cr ation of regional states 
dominated by particular ethnic groups. The creation of such ethnic based 
regional states holds serious dangers for the position of ethnic minority groups; 
groups which differ from the regionally dominant ethnic majority. The danger 
exists that the members of the regionally dominant ethnic group which consider 
the region as their exclusive dominion threaten both the universal and group 
specific rights of ethnic minorities within the region. This would not have been a 
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1 See, The Transitional period Charter of Ethiopia, Proclamation No 1, Negarit Gazeta 
50th year Addis Ababa, 22nd July 1991. 
2 See, Preamble of the New Constitution, Proclamation N . 1/1995, Proclamation of the 
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.  
3 See Generally, David Turton (2006), Introduction in David Turton (ed.) Ethnic 
Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative perspective (James Curry, 
Oxford); See also, Endrias Eshete (2003), Ethnic Federalism: New Frontiers in 
Ethiopian politics, paper presented at the 1st National Conference on Federalism 
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problem if all the ethnically organized regional states were inhabited by a 
homogenous ethnic population. However, ethnic minorities live in all Ethiopian 
regions and this sparks the legitimate concern for the exercise of their 
fundamental rights including their right to self determination. 
The first section of the comment discusses the turning point in the Ethiopian 
state arrangement in which the country under the Transitional Charter embarked 
upon the experiment of ethnic federalism. Section 2 highlights the consolidation 
of ethnic federalism upon the promulgation of the FDRE Constitution and its 
ramifications. The Ethiopian federal structure is revisited in the third section by 
addressing issues such as the carving out of the regional states, the division of 
powers between the federal and state governments as well as the provisions on 
the amendment of the Constitution. The last section articulates the content and 
context of self determination with a view to identifying the right holders and the 
political dynamic in which such a right is to be exercised within the country.   
1. The Transitional Period Charter: The Prelude to Ethnic 
Federalism  
Attempts to centralize the Ethiopian state came to an end by the year 1991 when 
the EPRDF forces established a transitional government in Addis Ababa. The 
competing ethno-nationalist claims for an equitable share of power and 
resources gained attention. The transitional period Charter provided for the 
establishment of local and regional councils for loca  administrative purposes to 
be defined on the basis of nationality.4 The subsequent proclamation providing 
for the establishment of national/regional self governments also set forth the 
same requirement5 which made it clear that the future of the country’s 
restructuring is to be based on ethnicity.6 
The Transitional Charter used ethnic based decentralization and the 
administrative map of the country was redrawn along li uistic and/or ethnic 
lines. The Transitional Charter that was signed by 27 representatives of political 
movements, of which the majority were predominantly e hnic-based,7 provided 
                                          
4 See, The Transitional Period Charter, supra note 1, Article 13. 
5 Proclamation No 7/1992, A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of National 
/Regional Self-governments. 
6 For a discussion of the transitional period Charter on the establishment of regional and 
national self governments See, Assefa Fiseha, Federalism and the Accommodation of 
Diversity in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study, (2007), Rev.edn, Addis Ababa Artistic 
Printing Enterprise), 49-54. 
7 Yacob Arsano (2007), People’s Choice and Political power in Ethiopia: Elections and 
Representations During Three Regimes in Kassahun Berhanu et.al.(eds.), Electoral 
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the political and legal framework for the creation f an 87 seat council of 
representatives. It incorporated an important principle in Article 2 of the 
Transitional Period Charter which is the right of “nations, nationalities and 
peoples to self-determination.” This provision further outlined a 
nation/nationality based framework for a federal like structure of local 
governments where each unit would administer its own local affairs.8 The 
Charter’s major political program was primarily centred on promulgating a 
new Constitution and holding national elections.9 The establishment of the self-
governing units was realized by Proclamation No. 7/1992, which laid down the 
legal basis for the creation of regional self-governments consisting of 14 
regions.10 
During the five years of the transitional period, three elections were held: the 
June 21, 1992 regional and local elections, the June 5, 1994 elections of the 
Constituent Assembly, and the May 7, 1995 elections t  the federal parliament 
and regional councils.11 Of these major elections, especially the 1994 election to 
the Constituent Assembly was aimed at electing representatives for the purpose 
of drafting the new Constitution. The EPRDF won a majority seat in the 
Constituent Assembly, which was vested with the power of drafting the new 
Constitution. Many controversial articles in the draft Constitution such as the 
right to self-determination including secession, ethnic-based federal structure of 
government, continued government ownership of land, were all approved 
without a serious debate.12 The new “national Constitution” was then approved 
in December 1994 with only a few dissenting voices.13 It proclaimed the country 
as the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 
 
                                                                                                 
Politics, Decentralized Governance and Constitutionalism in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa 
University press, 2007), 169-175. 
8 Tafesse Olika and Aklilu Abraham (2007), Legislation, Institutions and the Post 1991 
Elections in Ethiopia in Kassahun Berhanu et.al.(eds.), Electoral politics, 
Decentralized Governance and Constitutionalism in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa 
University press, 2007) 93-94. 
9 See, The transitional Charter, supra note 1, Article 10, 11, 12 and 13. 
10 For a discussion on the creation of the 14 regions of the time see, Merera Gudina 
(2003), Ethiopia: Competing Ethnic Nationalism and the Quest for Democracy 1960-
2000 (Shaker publishing), 122-123. 
11 Tafesse and Aklilu, supra note 8, p. 94. 
12 Merera Gudina (2003), supra note 10, p. 127. 
13 Merera Gudina (2007), Party Politics  and Elections in Ethiopia: 1991-2005 in 
Kassahun Berhanu et.al (eds.), Electoral politics, Decentralized Governance and 
Constitutionalism in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa University press, 2007), 132.  
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2. The New Constitution and the Issue of Minority Rights  
Even though the Transitional Period Charter did not spell the word federalism, it 
employed a federation type of arrangement.14 This ambiguity was cleared upon 
the promulgation of the new Constitution.15 Ethiopia was, in effect, fully 
transformed from a centralized unitary state to an ethnic federation, which 
recognizes the rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples to self-determination 
up to and including secession.16  
The new Constitution was intended to solve the problem of the ‘national 
question’ by presenting federalism as a solution.17 Whether this ethnic-
federalism has provided the appropriate solution to the country has however 
been subject to debate. For instance, scholars like M nasse Haile argue that, the 
new Ethiopian Constitution instead of resolving ethnic problems has on the 
contrary exacerbated them and concludes that it has brought about a zero sum 
progress.18 He states that ethnic federations have not been generally successful 
in large polities except perhaps, when they have been supplemented by other 
institutional arrangements, by peculiar societal facts or by threat or use of force, 
to constrain the centrifugal forces inherent in such federations but none of these 
are present in the current Ethiopian federation which makes it an unstable one.19 
Furthermore, the act of drawing regional boundaries ba ed on major ethnic 
groups, ipso facto, creates minority ethnic groups in each region, which are 
condemned to be permanent minorities without any hope f obtaining political 
power.20 Hence, the formation of such type of federation provides further 
grounds for the political parties to be formed along ethnic territorial units as 
they advocate the exclusive concerns of their respective constituencies 
                                          
14 See, Fasil Nahum (1997), Constitution for a Nation of Nations: The Ethiopian 
Prospect, (The Red Sea Press, Inc.), 44. 
15 Article 1 of the FDRE Constitution states that ‘this Constitution establishes a federal 
and democratic state structure.  Accordingly, the Ethiopian state shall be known as 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 
16 Asnake Kefale and Hussein Jemma (2007), Ethnicity as a Basis of Federalism in 
Ethiopia: Cases of the Harari National Regional State (HNRS) and Dire Dawa 
Administrative council (DDA), in Kassahun Berhanu et.al. (eds.), Electoral politics, 
Decentralized Governance and Constitutionalism in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa 
University press, 2007), 70. 
17 Ibid 
18 See generally, Minasse Haile (1996), “The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact 
upon Unity, Human Rights and Development”, 20 Sulfolk Transnational Law Rev.1.  
19 Ibid, p. 11. 
20 Ibid, it is worth noting here that the Constitution only creates nine regional states 
while the country is inhabited by more than eighty ethnic groups. 
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regardless of the consequences on the national interest.21 Minassie Haile 
generally concludes that such type of ethnic federation is inconsistent with the 
aim of nation building in peace and tranquility.22 
To the contrary, some consider the ethnic federalism experiment as a success 
story despite some inherent drawbacks. Cognizant of the situation in which the 
country had been at the time when various liberation movements and ethnic 
strife engulfed Ethiopia, the commitment to national self-determination and the 
establishment of regional governments based on nationality have, according to 
this view, ensured the survival of the Ethiopian state.23 They consider that the 
federal system has served as a conflict regulating device, by creating relatively 
homogenous states.24 
Surely, one can speak of the ethnic federal experiment to have brought a 
considerable change towards the accommodation of diversity (especially at the 
federal level of government) and to this effect it can be said that it is relatively 
of a success story. But if one looks at federalism at the regional level it is a 
different story. The relative diversity that may be present at the regional level 
has not been taken into consideration by the drafters of the Federal Constitution 
and the Constitution has not set any kind of mechanism for regulating tensions 
that may arise due to the competing claims of the diff rent ethnic groups.  
Moreover, the Constitutions of the various regional st tes, except for few, 
have not addressed the issue of their diversity. They simply ignore the reality of 
their population and consider the region to have ben inhabited only by the 
majority and/or dominant ethnic group/s. This is seriously at odds with the 
principle of federalism and ‘the accommodation of diversity’. In this regard, 
federalism at the regional level poses a serious danger to the stability of the 
federation in general and to the regional states in particular. 
3. The Federal Structure 
The federal Constitution defines the country’s structure as a multicultural 
federation based on ethno-national representation. I  stipulates that Ethiopia is of 
a ‘federal and democratic state.25 In line with the federal tradition, the respective 
powers of member states and the federal government are distributed by the 
                                          
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Assefa Fiseha (2006), “Theory Versus Practice in the Implementation of Ethiopia’s 
Ethnic Federalism”, in David Turton (ed.) Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian 
Experience in Comparative Perspective (James Curry, Oxford 2006) 135. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See Article 1of the FDRE Constitution. 
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federal Constitution.26 The federal government, with a bicameral parliament, is 
entrusted with the responsibility of national defens , foreign relations, monetary 
policies and foreign investment and the establishment and implementation of 
national standards on health, education, science and technology.27 The states 
have all powers not given expressly to the federal government alone or 
concurrently to the federal government and the state .28 Since the Constitution 
does not provide for a list of concurrent powers, one has to go through the whole 
body of the text in search of such powers to identify the powers reserved to the 
states.29 
The horizontal relationship between member states in the federation can be 
described as symmetrical because member states are constitutionally guaranteed 
equal rights and powers.30 The Constitution institutes a bicameral parliament, 
the House of People’s Representatives (HPR) and the House of the Federation 
(HoF).31 The highest authority in the federal state is thatof the HPR while the 
HoF, a non-legislative house is vested with authoriy to interpret the 
Constitution.32 It is composed of representatives from nations, natio lities and 
peoples of Ethiopia.33 It is also entrusted with the task of determining ssues 
related to the rights of ethnic groups to self-determination including secession, 
finding solutions to disputes between states and ascertaining the division of joint 
federal and state revenues and the federal subsidies to the states.34 
It can generally be argued that the Constitution adequately recognizes the 
multiethnic nature of the country. This can be discerned from the following 
instances. The preamble of the Constitution begins with the wordings “we, the 
nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia.”35 It also vests all sovereign 
power in the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia.36 All Ethiopian 
languages are accorded equal recognition and members of the federation may by 
law determine their respective working languages.37 
                                          
26 Article 51 and 52 of the FDRE Constitution. 
27 See, Ibid. 
28 Article 52 of the FDRE Constitution. 
29 Assefa Fiseha (2006), supra note 23, p. 133. 
30 Article 47(4) of the FDRE Constitution. 
31 Article 53 of the FDRE Constitution. 
32 See Articles 62,83 and 84 of the FDRE Constitution. 
33 Article 61(1) of the FDRE Constitution. 
34 Article 67 of the FDRE Constitution. 
35 Preamble of the FDRE Constitution. 
36 Article 8(1) of the FDRE Constitution. 
37 Article 5(1)(3)  of the FDRE Constitution. 
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The Constitution establishes nine regional states that are largely delimited 
along ethno-linguistic criteria.38 States of the federation are to be formed on the 
basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people 
concerned.39 The Constitution also provides for a guaranteed representation for 
minority nationalities and peoples by stipulating that at least 20 seats are 
reserved for these minority nationalities and peopls out of the maximum 
number of 550 seats in the HPR.40 The Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land, and it stipulates that any law customary practice or a decision of an organ 
of state or a public official which contravenes theConstitution shall be of no 
effect.41 
For the purpose of amending the Constitution, it is stated that except for the 
rights specified in chapter three, amendment may onl be effected when the 
HPR and the HoF, in a joint session approve a proposed amendment by a two-
third majority vote; and when two-thirds of the councils of the member states of 
the federation approve the proposed amendment by majority votes.42 Article 105 
of the Constitution embodies an additional stringent r quirement for the purpose 
of amendment of the Constitution.43 Hence, generally speaking the procedure 
for approving amendments to the Ethiopian Constitution is very rigid. 
4. Self-Determination: Subjects, Context and the Dilemma 
The content, right holders and the scope of the right to self-determination have 
been themes of debate among scholars. The principle of self-determination 
generally has two applications referred to as external and internal self-
determination. External self-determination applies to colonial situations in 
which territorial divisions of the state will be eff cted in forming an independent 
nation. Internal self-determination is, on the other and, concerned with the right 
of peoples within a state to choose their political status, the extent of their 
political participation and the form of their government.44  
 
 
                                          
38 See Article 47 of the FDRE Constitution. 
39 Article 46(2) of the FDRE Constitution. 
40 Article 54(3) of the FDRE Constitution. 
41 Article 9(1) of the FDRE Constitution. 
42 Article 105 (2) (a) and (b) of the FDRE Constitution. 
43 See, Article 105(1) (a),(b),& (c) of the FDRE Constitution. 
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4.1. Subjects of Self-Determination: Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples 
The FDRE Constitution has adopted the language ‘Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples’ (NNP) as a standard expression to designate ethnic groups. NNP for 
the purpose of the Constitution has been defined as ‘a group of people who have 
or share a large measure of a common culture or similar custom, mutual 
intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common 
psychological makeup, and who inhibit an identifiable, predominantly 
contiguous territory’.45 
From this definition one can discern that to be rega ded as a NNP (ethnic 
group) both subjective and objective criteria should be met.46 The subjective 
criteria are belief in common or related identity and psychological makeup, 
while the objective ones are language, culture and territory. However, the 
Constitution or other subsidiary laws have not expressly indicated the list of 
groups, which qualify as NNP and those which do not. If one looks at the 
composition of the HoF, it may be possible to check indirectly which groups 
qualify as NNP, because the HoF is composed of repres ntatives of each ethnic 
group. But this shall not mean that every NNP (ethnic group) in the country has 
a representative in the HoF. Thus the ethnic groups that can be said to have been 
recognized are the ones which are now represented i the HoF.47 
4.2. The Context or Content of Self-Determination in the 
FDRE Constitution 
The Constitution can be said to have adopted three modalities in the exercise of 
the right to self-determination.48 These are the right to secede (external self-
determination)49, the right to promote one’s language, culture and history 
                                          
45 Article 39(5) of the FDRE Constitution. 
46 Generally speaking Article 39(5) simply lumps together many factors together in 
designating Nations, Nationalities and Peoples but a closer look at the requirements 
reveals that some of them need factual determinatio while some simply are to be 
deduced subjectively upon the wishes of the specific group. See, Abate Nikodimos 
Alemayehu (2004), Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: Challenges and Opportunities, 
(Master Thesis, Fall 2004) Available at <www.addisvo ce.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/03/ethnic-federalism-.pdf>, 55-57,  accessed on December 23, 
2012. 
47 In this regard one can mention the “Kemant” people found in the Amhara Regional 
State who have filed a petition to the HoF to be recognized as a separate ethnic 
group. 
48 See, Fasil Nahum, supra note 14, pp., 53,154. 
49 Article 39(2) and (4) of the FDRE Constitution. 
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(cultural self-determination)50 and right to self government and regional 
autonomy (political self-determination).51 The right of every NNP in Ethiopia to 
the unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession has 
been included so that if the federal government abuses the rights of these 
constituent units, then they will be entitled to reassert their powers of 
sovereignty by withdrawing from the federation.52 This right is not even subject 
to derogation during national emergency.53  
The right to promote one’s language, culture and history seems to have been 
framed for the purpose of ending cultural domination. The third and most 
important aspect of self-determination is that of the political one. Political self-
determination aims at equitable and fair representatio  in the state as well as in 
the federal government. This is the most important aspect of the right to self-
determination in multiethnic societies like that of Ethiopia. The Constitution has 
guaranteed that every NNP has the right to full measure of self-government 
which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory it 
inhabits and to equitable representation in the stat  and federal government.  
4.3. The Dilemma in the Exercise of the Right to Self-
Determination 
As stated earlier, every NNP (ethnic group) is guaranteed the right to self-
determination without any condition attached to it.54 Although this guarantee, at 
face value, seems to provide a wide range of rights, its application is bundled 
with a lot of problems and it is hardly realizable. An example in this regard is 
whether an ethnic group can assert itself as a NNP in a regional state in which it 
is a minority and exercise its right to political self-determination. Secondly, 
there can be a question whether an ethnic group can assert itself as NNP outside 
of its mother state while it has been considered as a NNP within its own regional 
state. The third dilemma in the exercise of the right to self-determination relates 
to ethnic groups that do not have their own mother states. 
Apart from seeking answers to these questions from the FDRE Constitution, 
one has to look at the political context which seems to have a far reaching 
                                          
50 Article 39(2) of the FDRE Constitution. 
51 Article 39(3) of the FDRE Constitution. 
52 Assefa Fiseha (2006), supra note 23, p. 132.   See also, Matthew J. Mc Cracken, 
Abusing Self-Determination and Democracy: How the TPLF is looting Ethiopia, 36 
Case W. Res. J. Int’l .L. (2004). 
53 Article 93 of the FDRE Constitution. 
54 Since Article 39(1) states that ‘Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia have 
the unconditional right of self-determination …’ one may argue that no condition can 
be attached for the exercise of such right.  
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impact on the federal structure. This can be tackled from two angles. 
Constitutionally there are two mechanisms employed to protect the rights of 
different ethnic groups. The first relates to the right of the different ethnic 
groups to the unconditional right of self-determination including the right of 
secession. From a practical point of view, even if the secession of Eritrea was 
recognized through a similar principle under the Transitional Period Charter, the 
Ethiopian government does not seem to be in favor of secession for the current 
nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia (NNP).  Hence one may argue here 
that politically speaking, secession is not an option o an ethnic group.  
The second perspective is related with the constitutional right of an ethnic 
group (NNP) to establish, at any time, its own sate (outside the current regional 
state) within the federal framework.55 This too does not seem to be acceptable as 
it can be discerned from the fact that a number of ethnic groups have demanded 
that they be granted the status of statehood (especially ethnic groups of the 
Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples regional st te).56 No separate 
regional state has been established other than the nine regional states stated 
under the FDRE Constitution.  
The House of the Federation, which is entrusted with the task of 
constitutional interpretation, has not yet come up with decisions for the purpose 
of protecting such rights of ethnic groups. Therefor , one may safely conclude 
that the competing interests of different ethnic groups residing in the different 
parts of the regions is to be entertained only within t e context of the nine 
regional states. 
The regional states have been constitutionally design d as entities in which 
the different ethnic groups (NNP) can profess their diversity and live in 
harmony. This is mainly attributable to the political commitment of the 
government to address the problem of ethnicity in the country. On the one hand, 
the formation of the regional states is a response to the call for appropriate 
ethnic accommodation, and is meant to solve the problem of ethnic rivalries and 
competing interests. To this end, the Ethiopian federal arrangement can be 
viewed as a success, while at the same time it is also embedded with serious 
problems from the perspectives of the different ethno-linguistic groups within 
the regional states.  The other challenge relates to the pace of nation building in 
the context of a larger Ethiopian identity beyond ethnic and religious identities.  
The federal arrangement can indeed be regarded as a success story because it 
was a response to the civil wars that continued for decades particularly in the 
                                          
55 See, Article 47(2) of the FDRE Constitution. 
56 A number of ethnic groups have submitted demands to the HoF that they be given 
separate regional statehood. To this effect, one ca mention the demands by the 
Sidama and the Berta ethnic groups. 
 
 
COMMENT                                                                                                                                                                            343 
 
northern part of the country. On the other side, it has been a problematic 
approach mainly due to the problems that are arising out of the issues of 
federalism at the regional level. This is due to the fact that ethnic homogeneity 
could not be achieved in the regional states. Some regions are multiethnic and 
not ethnically homogenous.  
For example, in the regional state of Beneshangul Gumuz, the non-indigenous 
minorities in the region were underrepresented in the state’s legislative council. 
This is mainly attributable to the lack of adequate m chanisms (in the regional 
state’s Constitution) to accommodate diversity and guarantee representation. In 
this regard, the electoral law of the country has pl yed its role especially in the 
regional state of Benishangul by exacerbating the tension between indigenous 
and non-indigenous identities.  
The federal Constitution has not formulated any mechanism that can regulate 
such tensions that may arise in the exercise of the right to political self-
determination between the different ethnic groups within a given regional state. 
One may be tempted, at this point, to ask whether tis is a simple oversight by 
the drafters of the Constitution.  
Conclusion 
The federal arrangement between the nine regional states was a response to the 
right to self-determination of the NNP inhabiting in each regional state. In 
practice, however, this has resulted in the creation of the majority/dominant 
ethnic group hegemony in heterogeneously inhabited region states. This has not 
only resulted in the creation of minority ethnic groups within a given regional 
state but the minority ethnic group loses its constitutionally guaranteed right of 
self-determination in favor of the majority and/or dominant ethnic group. 
The right to political self-determination stipulated in the Constitution under 
the current political context and its practical application thus seem to suggest 
that the right will only apply to an ethnic group where that ethnic group inhabits 
only in one of the nine regional states in which it is either a majority or the 
dominant ethnic group.57 This is the core problem encountered by minorities at 
the regional level in asserting their constitutionally guaranteed right to self 
determination.  
                                          
57 Here I am not concluding that no ethnic group has so far exercised the right to 
political self-determination outside its own regional state. The Amhara regional state 
in this regard might be of a good experience, by which it has created ‘Nationality 
Administrations’ for its Oromo and Agew nationalities, in which they are a minority 
within the regional state. But the practice seems to uggest that regional minorities 
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The remedies should thus be sought at a broad political and policy levels.58  
The formation of the nine regional states under the FDRE Constitution does not 
in any way signify that the regions are the sole dominions of the dominant 
ethnic group/s. The federal arrangement should not also be misconstrued to 
allow the dominant ethnic group/s, in whatsoever manner, to exercise their 
rights without due recognition of the ethnic minorities in the regional state.  
These problems require solutions beyond declarations f intention and 
normative stipulations because political practices can be different from 
constitutional and other stipulations.  
In particular, the politically empowered ethnic group/s within a given 
regional state should not deprive regional minorities of their right to be 
represented in the state’s regional council. This envisages their right to establish 
institutions by which they can exercise self-rule. Therefore, remedies based on 
the context of a given regional state are mandatory with a view to bringing about 
solutions at broader political and policy levels.                                                 ■
                                                                                 
                                          
58 See generally, Assefa Fisseha (2006), supra note 23. 
